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TAX REFORM FERVOR: AN OPPORTUNITY TO
EXPAND TAX PREFERENCES
FOR CAPITAL GAINS
Capital gains and losses historically have played an instrumental role
in the United States federal income tax scheme.' Since 1921, the United
States Congress has afforded capital gains separate and preferential treat-
ment.2 This preferential treatment has caused, in large part, the tremen-
dous complexity in the Internal Revenue Code.3 In the recent fervor to
simplify the Code, numerous legislators and administrators have pro-
posed plans to overhaul the income tax system.4 The purpose of this
Note is to examine the preferred status of capital gains from an economic
perspective and to determine whether Congress should alter, contract, or
expand the preference.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of capital gains taxation. Part
II examines the micro and macroeconomic issues underlying the taxation
of capital gains. In Part III, this Note introduces and evaluates the capi-
tal gains provisions in current tax proposals. Finally, Part IV evaluates
the merits of reducing capital gains taxation and concludes that excessive
capital gains taxation unduly restricts the flow of assets to their most
valuable use. Effective capital formation and access to capital markets
are necessary "ingredients" to the efficient operation of a free world
economy. The Ninety-ninth Congress can provide the "leavening" by
expanding capital gains preferences.
I. See generally Mayhall, Capital Gains Taxation-The First One Hundred Years, 41 LA. L.
REV. 81 (1980). For a comprehensive presentation of arguments for and against preferential tax
treatment of capital gains, see Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES
247 (1957).
2. See infra notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text.
3. See Mayhall, supra note 1, at 81.
Indeed, the presence of [separate and preferential treatment of capital transactions] in the
income tax laws of the United States is largely responsible for the complexity of those
laws.... [MJost Americans do not understand how capital gains are taxed. Seemingly,
the very hint of understanding by the American taxpayer of a capital transaction taxing
statute has been cause for Congress to scrap mischievously that statute and replace it with
a more complex and circumspect model.
Id. See also Blum, supra note 1, at 247, 252, 262-63 (preferential treatment of capital gains is the
primary source of complexity in the tax laws); Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gain Taxa-
tion, 69 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1956) (preferential treatment of capital gains is the greatest barrier to
tax simplication efforts).
4. See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
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I. HISTORY OF CAPITAL GAINS TREATMENT
A. Early Supreme Court Decisions
The treatment of capital gains taxation in the United States has varied
dramatically. In Gray v. Darlington,5 the post-Civil War Supreme Court
excluded capital gains from taxable income, noting that the appreciation
in value of a capital asset over a number of years constituted a return of
capital rather than taxable gain.6 Almost fifty years later, however, in
Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co.7 and Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Smietanka,8 the Supreme Court reversed its position, holding that taxa-
ble income included capital gains realized by corporations and individu-
als. Although the Court based its new position on semantic differences in
the Civil War and twentieth-century tax acts,9 commentators have stated
that the Court based its decision at least in part on the belief that reaf-
firming Darlington would adversely affect tax revenues.' 0
Taxpayer responses to Gauley Mountain Coal Co. and Merchants',
however, reveal defects in the Supreme Court's fiscal policy. Contrary to
the Supreme Court's belief, the new system did not cause tax revenues to
increase. Rather, revenues decreased as taxpayers refrained from selling
capital assets that had appreciated in value, but simultaneously realized a
large number of capital losses.11 As a result, the pre-1921 tax structure
for capital gains "froze" venture capital, with taxpayers content to hold
investments that had appreciated in value.
5. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 63 (1872).
6. Id. at 63-66. The Court construed income to include only "annual" income, as opposed to
appreciation value over a number of years. Id.
7. 247 U.S. 189 (1918).
8. 255 U.S. 509 (1921).
9. See Comment, Profits from Sale of Capital Assets as Income: Taxable Under Sixteenth
Amendment, 19 MICH. L. Rv. 854 (1921) (criticizing the Court's arbitrary distinction between the
language of the two acts).
10. See Recent Cases, Income Tax-Profit on Conversion of Capital Assets is Taxable asIncome,
16 ILL. L. REv. 68 (1916) (suggesting fiscal ramifications as an underlying basis for the Court's
decision). Commentators also note that the Court decided Gauley Mountain Coal Co. and
Merchants' after the states ratified the sixteenth amendment, when public opinion was more recep-
tive to income taxation. Id.
11. See Tremaine, The Capital Gains Tax, 15 TAXES 517, 567 (1937). "[Tjhis [capital gains]
tax is holding back recovery by freezing capital, and if it were repealed ... the Government...
would... receive more revenue through taxes on increased income from the business produced by
the circulation of capital thus released." Id. See also Hogan, The Capital Gains Tax, 9 TAXEs 165
(1931) (the capital gains tax furnishes incentive for wealthy taxpayers to realize only capital losses
and invest in tax exempt securities); Comment, Profit on Investment as Taxable Income, 30 YALE
L.J. 396, 400 (1921) (same).
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B. Legislative Change-1921 to Present
Dissatisfied with the pre-1921 tax system,1 2 Congress passed the Reve-
nue Act of 1921,13 providing separate and preferential tax treatment for
capital gains. This Act allowed taxpayers to elect an alternative flat tax
of only 12.5 percent for all realized capital gains.'
4
Since 1921, however, Congress has provided wildly fluctuating capital
gains treatment.' 5 The 1934, 1942, 1969, and 1976 tax laws, for example,
substantially reduced tax preferences for capital gains. 16 Conversely, the
1938, 1978, and 1981 tax amendments reinstated favorable capital gains
preferences. 17 The current tax law enables taxpayers to exclude sixty per-
cent of long-term capital gains. t8 Combined with the current maximum
ordinary income tax rate of fifty percent, 19 this exclusion reduces the
maximum effective long-term capital gains rate to twenty percent.20
In summary, the history of capital gains taxation in the United States
represents a politically volatile compromise between two polar positions.
At one extreme, opponents of preferential capital gains treatment argue
that taxing capital gains as ordinary income reduces the Internal Reve-
nue Code's complexity. 21 Proponents of preferential treatment for capi-
tal gains, on the other hand, argue that reduced capital gains rates will
promote both the realization of capital gains and the economy as a whole
by facilitating the transfer of venture capital. 2  In light of the volatile
nature of capital gains taxation, however, one must wonder what criteria
Congress has employed in assessing the merits of prior legislative propos-
12. See Hogan, supra note 11, at 165.
13. Income Tax Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227.
14. The 1921 Act allowed taxpayers to omit net realized capital gains from ordinary income by
electing a flat tax of 12.5% for all realized capital gains. Individuals in high tax brackets favored the
1921 Act's capital gains election because from 1913 to 1921, Congress taxed all capital gains at
ordinary rates as high as 73%. See Hogan, supra note 11, at 165-67.
15. See Blum, supra note 1, at 261 (change in capital gains taxation has been particularly fre-
quent). See also Mayhall, supra note 1, at 81 (comparing the history of capital gains taxation to an
anchorless dinghy awash in a turbulent sea).
16. See Mayhall, supra note 1, at 88, 90-92.
17. Id. at 89-90, 92.
18. I.R.C. § 1202 (1978).
19. I.R.C. § 1 (1982).
20. The maximum effective rate (20%) is calculated by multiplying the highest marginal tax
rate (50%) by the portion of long-term capital gain to be included in ordinary income after the 60%
exclusion (40%). See text accompanying supra notes 18 & 19. The capital gains tax, however, is
progressive. Only those taxpayers in the highest tax brackets are subjected to the 20% rate.
21. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
22. See supra note I 1 and accompanying text.
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als. The history of capital gains taxation is more typical of rhythmical
crescendos and diminuendos of a highly political melody than sound
analysis of economic fundamentals.
II. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Recent tax reform efforts will once again bring the issue of preferential
capital gains treatment to the political forefront. If the historical ebb and
flow of capital gains taxation is any indication, noneconomic considera-
tions are likely to play a significant role in its future.23 A more prudent
Ninety-ninth Congress should discard political biases and assess the
treatment of capital gains taxation from an economic standpoint. Con-
gressmen who refuse to formulate tax policies in light of economic goals
necessarily view the capital gains issue in a political microcosm. This
Note next examines the micro and macroeconomic issues underlying the
taxation of capital gains.
A. A Microeconomic Perspective-The Lock-In Effect
Microeconomic analysis addresses the economic incentives that face
individuals.24 An individual investor must consider many factors when
deciding to hold or sell an asset that has appreciated in value. The inves-
tor may need to improve a cash flow shortage or may want to invest in
another capital asset with greater speculative value. Regardless of an
individual's motivation for engaging in a capital gains transaction, cur-
rent tax law has powerful ramifications on that decision. 25 Although the
tax consequences vary with the individual's income tax bracket, 26 taxa-
tion of capital gains effectively reduces the proceeds from the sale,
thereby discouraging the sale of capital assets that have appreciated in
23. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
24. The study of economics is divided into two major areas: micro and macro.
Microeconomics is concerned mainly with the economic activities of individual[s], ..
[while] [m]acroeconomics is concerned with economic aggregates, or the economy as a
whole.
* [Much of what the government does in terms of enacting laws or levying taxes
directly affects individuals . . . . and these effects can be analyzed with the tools of
microeconomics. By the same token, the actions of large groups of consumers or produ-
cers, such as the increased desire to save on the part of many people, are analyzed with
macroeconomic tools.
W. PETERSON, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS: MICRO 1 (1974).
25. Current tax law subjects realized capital gains to a maximum effective tax rate of 20%. See
supra note 20.
26. Current marginal tax rates on ordinary income reach a maximum of 50%. See supra note
19 and accompanying text.
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value.27 This restraint, commonly referred to as the "lock-in effect,"
freezes large sums of venture capital into mature investments. To over-
come the tax obligation and any other transaction costs, 28 an alternative
investment's annual cash yield or expected future market value must suf-
ficiently exceed that of the current investment.29
By failing to tax transfers by gift or inheritance, the present tax system
magnifies the lock-in effect. Property transferred by gift receives a "car-
ryover" basis in the hands of a donee,3 0 while property transferred by
reason of death receives a "stepped-up" basis in the hands of a devisee.3"
Because neither the donee's nor the devisee's increased net worth is taxa-
ble,32 the tax system further discourages the sale of appreciated capital
assets.
A final aspect of the lock-in effect concerns the unique nature of capi-
tal gains.33 Because capital gains normally accumulate over a number of
years, proponents of favorable capital gains preferences claim that it is
unjust to tax the gain at a progressive rate in the single year of realiza-
tion.34 Furthermore, proponents allege that capital gains frequently re-
27. See STAFF OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 88TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE FEDERAL
TAX SYSTEM: FACTS AND PROBLEMS 77-82 (Comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter cited as JOINT Eco-
NOMIC COMMITTEE].
28. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. OF L. AND ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (introducing the
concept of positive transaction costs as an economic disincentive).
29. This tax consideration may be illustrated in the case of an investor with 100 shares of
corporation X bought at $50 and now selling at $80 per share. Assume that the X stock is
now yielding 6 percent on the basis of its current price and the taxpayer is considering a
shift to another stock yielding 7 percent on the basis of its current price. At the present tax
rate of 25 percent, the net proceeds after the tax from the sale of the X stock would be
$7,250 ($8,000 minus 25 percent of $3,000) which, if invested in the new stock, would yield
more than the yield in the securities sold ($507.50 compared with $480). The switch would
therefore be justified, it would also be justified if the taxpayer expected his present holdings
to remain at their present price while the new stock was expected to rise in price by 10.3
percent or more. Similarly, sale of the present holdings would be justified if their price
were expected to decline by $7.50 or more per share (from $80 to $72.50 or less).
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, supra note 27, at 77-78.
30. Code § 1015(a) provides, in pertinent part: "[i]f the property was acquired by gift ..., the
basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the donor or the last preceding owner by whom
it was not acquired by gift." I.R.C. § 1015(a) (1985).
31. Code § 10 14(a) provides, in pertinent part: "the basis of property in the hands of a person
acquiring the property from a decedent ... shall be... the fair market value of the property at the
date of the decedent's death." I.R.C. § 1014(a) (1985).
32. See I.R.C. § 102 (1985): "Gross income does not include the value of property acquired by
gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance." Id. at § 102(a).
33 JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, supra note 27, at 77-82.
34 Id. at 80-81. See Blum, supra note 1, at 253 (capital gains often develop over many years-
Argument 16).
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sult from general increases in the aggregate price level35 and thus, do not
reflect an increased ability to pay taxes.36 Finally, proponents argue that
imposition of a capital gains tax prohibits the taxpayer from reinvesting
in an asset of equal value and therefore, represents government acquisi-
tion of a potentially invaluable source of private investment capital.37
From a microeconomic standpoint, the lock-in effect encourages indi-
viduals to retain capital in mature investments, and restricts the supply
of venture capital available to growth-oriented enterprises. 3  In order to
understand the cumulative impact of the lock-in effect, however, a
macroeconomic analysis is necessary.
B. A Macroeconomic Perspective
While microeconomics addresses individual economic decisions, 39 the
fundamental concerns of macroeconomics include inflation, unemploy-
ment, and aggregate savings and investment.
By producing a lock-in effect that reduces the net proceeds from the
sale of capital assets, the taxation of capital gains provides individuals
with a disincentive to save and invest.' When aggregated, this individ-
ual disincentive can have a detrimental effect upon a national economy.4 t
Economists almost universally accept the notion that increased savings
and investment is necessary to maintain or stimulate economic growth.42
35. Current legislation arbitrarily attempts to compensate for inflation (e.g., by allowing tax-
payers a 60% deduction for capital gains). See I.R.C. § 1202 (1978). Economic studies, however,
indicate that the impact of inflation on capital gains is still quite significant. See K. MALONEY, THE
IMPACT OF INFLATION ON CAPITAL FORMATION: A NEOCLASSICAL APPROACH (1984) (approxi-
mately 42% or $477 million of 1973 capital gains tax revenue resulted from inflation) (citation
omitted).
36. Joint Economic Committee, supra note 27, at 80. Congress acknowledged this problem by
authorizing homeowners to avoid tax liability by applying the proceeds of a sale of a personal resi-
dence to the purchase of another residence, regardless of any realized capital gain. Id., citing I.R.C.
§ 1034 (1985). See Blum, supra note 1, at 255-56 (most capital gains are fictitious reflections of
inflation-Argument 19).
37. Joint Economic Committee, supra note 27, at 80. See Blum, supra note 1, at 248 (tax on
capital gains slows society's accumulation of capital-Argument 2).
38. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
39. See supra note 24.
40. See supra notes 11 & 26-31 and accompanying text. But see Blum, supra note 1, at 250
(favorable capital gains provisions discriminate in favor of one form of economic enhancement over
another).
41. See M. EAKER & J. YAWITz, MACROECONOMICS 284 (1984).
42. Id.
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1. Economic Theory--Supply Side Economics
Some economic theorists maintain that the impact of the lock-in effect
can be lessened by reducing the taxation of capital gains. These supply-
side economists base their premise upon an analysis of the supply of loan-
able funds, 43 theorizing that decreasing capital gains taxes increases indi-
vidual savings. As individuals increase savings, lending institutions have
more money to lend. Because the aggregate supply of loanable funds
increases, interest rates fall.' Lower interest rates, in turn, stimulate in-
vestment as businesses find additional financial opportunities economi-
43. The market for loanable funds can be described by conventional supply and demand curves.
The interest rate, or "price" of loanable funds, is on the vertical axis and the quantity is on the
horizontal axis. The supply of loanable funds (S) represents the aggregate quantity of funds that
individuals will save at a given interest rate, while demand (D) represents the sum that individuals
will borrow at a given interest rate. The intersection of the supply and demand curves indicates the
equilibrium rate of interest (price) and quantity that will prevail in the market.
Market for Loanable Funds
US
0
\D
Q Quantity of Funds ($)
M. EAKER & . YAWITZ, supra note 41, at 157 (Figure 8-1).
44. Higher savings rates result in an increase in the supply of loanable funds (S to S') and a
decrease in market interest rates (r to r').
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cally feasible.45
2. Criticism of Supply Side Economics-Crowding Out
Other economic theorists, while accepting the supply side effect, criti-
cize the theory for its failure to consider changes in the demand for loan-
An Increase in the Supply of Loanable Funds
r
0
Q Q'
Quantity of Funds (S)
M. EAKER & J. YAWITZ, supra note 32, at 167 (Figure 8-7).
45. Most companies use the net present value (NPV) method to evaluate investment alterna-
tives. Under the NPV method, financial analysts project expected cash flows over the life of a pro-
ject. Financial analysts then discount the projected cash flows to their present value at prevailing
market interest rates. Although a specific firm's cost of capital depends on many factors, such as its
debt-equity ratio and its past borrowing record, the general level of interest rates is established in the
loanable funds market. See supra note 43. The net present value equation for an investment project
with a life of t years is described below:
0 CCtNPV = -(l+r)
t
where: Ct = expected net cash flow in year t
r = interest rate (or cost of capital)
R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 26-27 (1981).
As the interest rate decreases, see supra note 44, the NPV increases. Businesses are more likely to
make investments with higher net present values. M. EAKER & J. YAWITZ, supra note 32, at 56.
But see Blum, supra note 1, at 259-60 (arguing that the capital gains exemption does not increase
business investment-Argument 23) & 264-65 (preferential capital gains treatment provides incen-
tive for corporations to retain profits-Argument 6).
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able funds.4 6 These theorists claim that reducing capital gains taxation
reduces tax revenues and forces the government to borrow additional
funds in financial markets. Unlike private industry's demand for loan-
able funds, however, the government's demand is inelastic. 47 The gov-
ernment's demand remains constant regardless of interest rate levels
because the government must finance all deficits.48 The aggregate de-
mand for loanable funds, which encompasses government and private de-
mand, increases. Consequently, market interest rates rise.49 When
interest rates rise, businesses find fewer financial opportunities economi-
cally feasible. As a result, the government's inelastic demand "crowds
out" some of the positive influence of reduced interest rates and in-
46. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
47 An inelastic demand curve is characterized by a lack of responsiveness to a change in
prices. In the loanable funds market, the government's demand (D0 ) is equal to the amount of its
budget deficit (Q) and is independent of prevailing interest rates.
Government Demand for Loanable Funds
DG
4)2
Q
Quantity of Funds ($)
M. EAKER & J. YAwITz, supra note 32, at 159 (Figure 8-2).
48 Id.
49, Greater government deficits result in an increase in the demand for loanable funds (D to
D*) and higher market interest rates (r to r*).
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creased private investment.50
Unfortunately, econometric estimates of the crowding out effect vary
across the spectrum.5 Empirical evidence, however, suggests a positive
correlation between capital gains preferences and aggregate savings and
investment.
3. Empirical Evidence-International Comparisons
Since World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom have
An Increase in the Investment Demand Schedule
Q Q Quantity of Funds ($)
M. EAKER & J. YAWITZ, supra note 32, at 164 (Figure 8-5).
50. Economists describe the process as follows:
Crowding out occurs when government borrowing in the financial markets has the secon-
dary effect of reducing private investment. Government borrowing increases the demand
for funds and leads to higher interest rates.... Higher borrowing costs raise the discount
rate that firms use in making capital-budgeting decisions, resulting in fewer investments.
Id. at 104.
51. The impact of crowding out is dependent on numerous factors. Id. at 104-05 (suggesting
three distinct factors). Economists, however, have not accurately determined the amount of private
investment displaced by crowding out. Compare Minarik, The Effects of Taxation on the Selling of
Corporate Stock and the Realization of Capital Gains: Comment, 99 Q.J. ECON. 93 (1984) (reduced
capital gains taxes will not increase realizations sufficiently to increase federal tax revenues) with
Feldstein, Slemrod, & Yitzhaki, The Effect of Taxation on the Selling of Corporate Stock and the
Realization of Capital Gains: Reply, 99 Q.J. ECON. 111, 117-19 (1984) (1978 increase in capital gains
exclusion ratio caused increase in realization of capital gains and tax revenues). Commentators have
stated that "[e]mpirical estimates of crowding out are as diverse as the theoretical arguments. They
range from zero to over one." M. EAKER & J. YAWITZ, supra note 41, at 105 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 63:777
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maintained the lowest growth rates among all industrialized nations.52
These two nations have also maintained correspondingly low savings53
and investment 54 rates. This relationship between growth rates and
52. See J. EAKER & J. YAwrrz, supra note 41, at 284. Postwar growth rates can be measured
an terms of both real (indexed for inflation) gross national product, per capita income and average
annual growth in productivity.
Growth Rates in Real Gross National Product, 1960-81 (Percent Change)
1960-73
ANNUAL
AVERAGE 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Japan 10.5 - .3 1.4 6.5 5.3 5.1 5.6 4.2 3.8
Canada 5.4 3.6 1.2 5.5 2.1 3.7 3.5 .0 3.0
West Germany 4.8 .5 1.8 5.2 2.8 3.6 4.5 1.8 -1.0
United States 4.2 - .6 - 1.1 5.4 5.5 4.8 3.2 - .2 1.9
United Kingdom 3.2 -1.0 - .6 3.6 1.3 3.3 1.4 -1.8 -2.0
Id. at 275 (Table 14-2) (citing Economic Report of the President, 1982).
1970-79 Growth Rate in Per Capita Income
Japan 17.3%
Germany 13.7%
United States 9.4%
Canada 6.9%
ML at 275-76 (Table 14-3) (citing International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics).
Average Annual Gain in Productivity (1960-1983)
Japan 5.9%
West Germany 3.4%
United States 1.2%
I. Aim & R. Black, Yankee Trader, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP. 64, 65 (Apr. 8, 1985) (Efficiency
Table).
53. See M. EAKER & J. YAWITZ, supra note 41, at 284. The chart below shows average annual
gross saving from 1960-1980, expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product, for a selected
group of industrialized nations.
Nation Saving Rate
Japan 35.5%
West Germany 25.9%
Canada 21.6%
United States 19.2%
United Kingdom 18.8%
ML at 285 (citing the National Accounts of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment Countries).
54. See R. Alm & R. Black, supra note 52, at 65.
One businessman noted that:
[A]s a matter of official policy backed up by tax structure, the other advanced industrial
nations have since the 1950's been investing much more of their GNP in new plant and
equipment than we have in the United States. In... Germany, they are proportionally
investing two times as much, and in Japan three times as much, as we are in new ventures,
Washington University Open Scholarship
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propensities to save and invest is more than coincidental. Japan and
West Germany, two commercialized countries with more promising
postwar growth rates,5 have enjoyed extremely high savings and invest-
ment rates. 6
America's poor postwar savings rate is at least partially due to the fact
that Congress has enacted tax schemes without examining their eco-
nomic impact. 7 The lock-in effect is a perfect example of a tax scheme
with adverse economic consequences. By taxing the realization of a capi-
tal gain, Congress effectively reduces the proceeds from the sale of a capi-
tal asset5 and provides only disincentives to save and invest. Empirical
evidence supports this proposition. Japan and West Germany, the two
nations with the greatest propensity to save,5 9 severely restrict taxes on
capital gains.6 0 The United States and the United Kingdom, on the other
new technology, and new plant and equipment. And their productivity has been increasing
two or three times as fast ours.
R. JONES, TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: How Do WE REVERSE THE DECLINE? 5 (address deliv-
ered by Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of General Electric Co. on Mar. 27, 1979 and co-
sponsored by Center for the Study of American Business and Washington University School of
Business and Public Administration).
55. See supra note 52.
56. See supra note 54.
57. Martin Feldman has suggested that the poor saving record of the United States... [is
the] legac[y] of John Maynard Keynes .... Keynes's theories were largely motivated by
the Depression. During the 1930s there was excess capacity, so that the econom[y] of the
United States... [was] not supply-constrained in any way. Keynes argued that saving was
not only unnecessary but in fact part of the cause of the Depression. Saving reduced the
level of demand in an economic environment in which output could expand without addi-
tional investment. The crucial problem was not growth in the level of inputs [e.g., saving]
but rather the full utilization of existing resources. As a result, Keynes favored policies
that stimulated demand at the expense of saving. Feldstein hypothesizes that Keynes's
emphasis on demand has carried over until recently, especially in the United States ....
One consequence is that tax... policies have been enacted without questioning their impact
on saving. Feldstein and others have now begun to analyze those effects, including that
saving has been discouraged, much to the detriment of economic growth.
M. EAKER & J. YAwrrZ, supra note 41, at 284 (footnote omitted) (discussing Feldstein, America's
New Savings Policy, Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 1981).
58. See supra notes 11 & 27 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 53 & 54 and accompanying text.
60. Tax Rates in Other Major Industrial Countries, Wall St. J., May 30, 1985, at 12 [hereinafter
cited as Tax Rates]. In West Germany, capital gains are exempt from taxation, except for short-
term "speculative" profits. In Japan, capital gains from securities sales are exempt. Id. See also
SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASS'N & ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO., COMPARISON OF INDIVIDUAL TAXA-
TION OF LONG AND SHORT TERM CAPITAL GAINS ON PORTFOLIO STOCK INVESTMENTS IN TEN
COUrTRIES (1980) (Australia, Belgium, Italy, Japan, West Germany and other nations do not tax
capital gains); NATIONAL BUREAU ON ECONOMIC SECURITIES, FOREIGN TAX POLICIES AND ECo-
NOMIC GROWTH 57 (1966) (capital gains on securities exempt from taxation in Japan); M. KING &
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss4/7
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hand, are modem-day havens for capital gains taxation.6 Although the
lock-in effect does not completely explain the United States' low savings,
investment, and growth rates,62 legislation reducing or eliminating capi-
tal gains taxation would at least provide an appropriate incentive for pri-
vate savings and investment.
III. CAPITAL GAINS PROPOSALS
Recent tax reform efforts offer the Ninety-ninth Congress an opportu-
nity to contract, alter or expand the preference for capital gains.63
Although the thought of reducing tax preferences for capital gains
alarms many economists,"M the Bradley-Gephardt "Fair Tax Act,"65 the
Treasury Department's "Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity and Eco-
nomic Growth" (Treasury I),66 and two less widely acclaimed propos-
als67 would completely eliminate tax preferences for capital gains.
D. FULLERTON, THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 154 (1984) (no individual capital gains
tax in West Germany).
61. See Tax Rates, supra note 60, at 12. The United States imposes a maximum effective rate of
20% on long-term capital gains, while Great Britain taxes net gains in excess of $7,028 at 30%. See
also V. DIPALMA, CAPITAL GAINS TAX 1 (1972) (capital gains tax initiated in 1962); M. KING & D.
FULLERTON, supra note 60, at 35 (1982 amendment allows 5,000 £ annual exclusion and indexation
of capital gains).
62. The United States, for example, currently provides incentives to spend by permitting liberal
interest expense deductions. See I.R.C. § 163 (1985). Conversely, the high savings rate among the
Japanese may be due to a number of factors, including different cultural values, the lack of a social
security system, and liberal exclusions for interest income. Interview with Dr. Joel Prakken, Ad-
junct Professor of Economics at Washington University in St. Louis (Feb. 18, 1985).
63. The six most well-known tax reform proposals are: (1) the Treasury Department proposals,
(2) Bradley-Gephardt, (3) Kemp-Kasten, (4) Roth-Moore, (5) Nickles-SilIjander, and (6) DeConcini-
Shelby. For a summary of the key elements of the capital gains provisions under each proposal, see
Appendix A.
64. Several economists at the Center for the Study of American Business have noted that:
one aspect of the proposed reforms has important implications for business investment but
has received little attention: curtailing the preferential treatment currently granted capital
gains income .... The smaller the exclusion, the costlier to shareholders (in after-tax
terms) is a firm's decision to retain earnings rather than pay dividends, and the higher the
dividend return that the firm must offer to attract equity capital. Hence, reducing (or
eliminating) the exclusion for capital gains raises the cost of capital and discourages busi-
ness investment.
J. PRAKKEN, L. MEYER & C. VARVARES, FLAT TAXES AND CAPITAL FORMATION 3 (1984).
65. See OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEP'T OF TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS,
SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 174 (1984) [hereinafter cited as TREASURY DEPARTMENT
RECOMMENDATION].
66. Id. at 76, 174.
67, Both the Roth-Moore and DeConcini-Shelby tax reform bills completely eliminate tax pref-
erences for capital gains. Id.
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Treasury I, however, would index capital gains to inflation, thereby elim-
inating that portion of appreciation derived from aggregate price level
increases. 6 8 In contrast to these proposals, President Reagan's "Tax Pro-
posals for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity" and the Kemp-Kasten "Fast
Tax Act" would grant the taxpayer the option of accepting a percentage
deduction for net realized capital gains or indexing capital gains for
inflation.69
A. Eliminating Preferences for Capital Gains
Tax reformers proposing to eliminate the tax preference for capital
gains7° claim that preferential treatment is the primary source of com-
plexity in tax law.7 In addition, proponents maintain that tax adminis-
trators cannot prevent uneconomic and evasive activities designed to
convert ordinary income into capital gains.72 Proponents, however, fail
to assess accurately the economic impact of such a proposal. At all in-
come levels, individuals who rely more heavily on capital gains as op-
posed to ordinary income would incur greater taxes.73 Despite
supporters' statements to the contrary,74 eliminating tax preferences for
68. Ia at 76, 174. For example, ifa taxpayer purchased a capital asset for $100 and sold it one
year later for $110, the taxpayer would increase the asset's basis to compensate for any inflation
during the holding period. Assuming a 10% inflation rate, the taxpayer would increase the asset's
basis to $110 and would pay no tax on the appreciated value.
69. Id. Treasury II's option to index capital gains for inflation, however, does not take effect
until 1991 and only applies to individuals. Treasury II retains the current 28% capital gains rate for
corporations. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INsTITUTE, THE ADMINISTRATIoN's 1985 TAX PROPOSAlS
29 (1985).
70. The Bradley-Gephardt "Fair Tax Act," for example, would completely eliminate tax pref-
erences for capital gains. S. 1421, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 7836 (1983). Under
Bradley-Gephardt, the maximum effective rate imposed on capital gains would increase from 20%
to 30%. See Appendix A.
71. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
72. See Blum, supra note 1, at 263-65 (elaborate rules cannot prevent efforts to turn economic
benefits into capital gains).
73. S. 1421, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 7850-51 (1983).
74. Senator Bradley introduced his tax reform proposal to the Senate by stating:
So what this bill says is that the most effective stimulant to investment is the lowest
possible rate of taxation for all businesses and investments, not just for those who happen to
have the best access to the political process.
I believe that most of those preferences we have put in the Tax Code over the years are
not well designed to promote economic growth or create new jobs. On the contrary, they
have made the tax system a hurdle that the private sector has to get over in order to be able
to create those jobs and fuel economic growth or create new jobs. So what we in the
Congress should do is to design a tax system that has the lowest possible rate, the lowest
possible hurdle that the private sector can get over easily to produce jobs. That is what we
have done with this bill.
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capital gains would enhance the lock-in effect and would provide disin-
centives to save and invest.7 5 Opponents allege that the proposal is a
form of "capital punishment," rather than tax reform.7 6
B. Indexing Capital Gains for Inflation
Some tax reformers propose to eliminate the tax preference for capital
gains and to tax only that portion of gain in excess of the inflation rate."
Because capital gains derived from inflation do not reflect an increased
ability to pay taxes, indexing would promote fairness among taxpayers.
Indexing alone, however, would only partially compensate for the loss of
the present law's liberal capital gains exclusion. While indexing would
provide benefits for long-term investments in "blue-chip" stocks, it
would penalize investments in high-risk, high-return ventures.78
Contrary to President Reagan's statements,79 indexing would create a
bias against formation of venture capital in entrepreneurial activities.8 0
As a result, the Treasury Department, in Treasury II, granted taxpayers
an option either to index capital gains for inflation or to exclude a speci-
fied percentage of net realized capital gains from income.81
C. Expanding the Preference for Capital Gains
Tax reform plans proposing to expand the tax preference for capital
gains fare well under a supply side analysis.82 By reducing the effective
S. 1421, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 7837 (1983) (emphasis added).
75. See supra notes 24-38 and accompanying text.
76. Ruhm, Capital Punishment-The Case Against Taxing Long-Term Gains, Barron's 26
(Aug. 20, 1984).
77. See TREASURY DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDATION, supra note 65, at 76, 174. The maxi-
mum effective rate imposed on capital gains could be as high as 35% in a noninflationary economy.
See Appendix A.
78. P. Blustein, Capital Gains" Tax Plan Would Aid Some Investors But Hurt Others, Wall St.
J., Apr. 15, 1985, at 27, col. 4. See Blum, supra note 1, at 256-58 (capital gains taxation impairs
mobility of capital-Argument 21).
79. President Reagan, in his State of the Union Address of February 6, 1985, stated: "To-
gether, we can pass, this year, a tax bill for fairness, simplicity, and growth making this economy the
engine of our dreams and America the investment capital of the world." St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Feb. 7, 1985, at I, col. 4 (emphasis added). He further added that Treasury I's tax simplification
would be "a giant step toward unleashing the tremendous pent-up power of our economy." Id.
80. See P. Blustein, supra note 78, at 27, col. 6 (low capital gains taxation stimulates en-
trepreneurial activities); P. Behr, Tax Plan Scares Venture Capitalists, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1984, at
CI-C2 (venture capitalists fear Treasury I's impact on capital formation).
81. See TREASURY DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDATION, supra note 65, at 76, 174.
82. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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net tax rate on capital gains, individual savings would increase. As a
result, the aggregate supply of loanable funds would increase, placing
downward pressure on interest rates.8
3
Such tax reform plans, however, are subject to economic and political
criticisms. Economists who oppose supply side theories argue that the
combination of an increased federal deficit and the federal government's
inelastic demand for loanable funds would "crowd out" increased private
investment by exerting upward pressure on interest rates.8 4 Moreover,
some politicians claim that an increased capital gains preference would
favor only wealthy taxpayers. 5
An analysis of empirical data, however, suggests that these economic
and political criticisms lack merit. First, the Treasury Department de-
rives less than five percent of total income tax revenues from capital gains
transactions. 86 Moreover, the Treasury Department estimates that reve-
nues derived from capital gains taxes would increase substantially as a
result of Treasury II's reduced maximum effective long-term capital
gains rate.8 7 In other words, Treasury II would create a negative crowd-
ing out effect. The government's demand for loanable funds would de-
crease, putting downward pressure on interest rates, thereby stimulating
83. Id.
84. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
85. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the benefits of the capital gains exclusion
are distributed more heavily among the highest income classes:
Income Returns Amount
Below $20,000 1,815,000 $ 795 mil.
$20,000-$30,000 1,113,000 $ 890 mil.
$30,000-$50,000 1,589,000 $ 1,913 mil.
$50,000-$100,000 990,000 $ 2,918 mil.
Over $100,000 360,000 $12,741 mil.
Tax Reforms: Who'd Be Hurt if it Passes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 6, 1985, at 80. See also
Bartlett, The Federal Tax Debate: Capital Gains, BACKGROUNDER, Dec. 27, 1984, at 2 (45% of all
net long-term capital gains accrued to taxpayers with incomes above $100,000); Feldstein, Slemrod
& Yitzhaki, supra note 51, at 118 (wealthy taxpayers are more reactive to increased preferences for
capital gains); S. Lee, The Case for Cutting the Capital Gains Tax, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 4, 1983, at 47
(identifying the political concern that the tax break primarily benefits the wealthy).
86. See Ruhm, supra note 76, at 26 (only $12 billion of approximately $300 billion in federal tax
revenues are derived from the capital gains tax).
87. The Treasury Department estimates that Treasury II's proposed reduction in the maximum
effective long-term capital gains rate from 20% to 17.5% would increase tax revenues by $18.5
billion over the next five years. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, THE ADMINISTRATION'S 1985
TAX PROPOSALS 96 (1985) (Table A3). But see Blum, supra note 1, at 252 (aggregate tax revenues
are not relevant to determining the proper tax base-Argument 13).
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private investment. 88
In addition, because most of the increased capital tax revenues would
be derived from wealthy taxpayers, 9 increasing the tax preference for
capital gains would not result in a tax windfall for the wealthy. Rather,
it would encourage all taxpayers to realize successful investments and to
reinvest the proceeds in high-risk, high-return ventures. 90 After the 1978
and 1981 Revenue Acts reduced the maximum effective capital gains
rate, 91 new issues of common stock tripled their pre-1978 levels. 92 More-
over, the 1978 Act's increased exclusion for capital gains led to a seventy-
three percent increase in realizations of accrued net long-term gains by
1980,"3 evidencing the magnitude of the lock-in effect.94
IV. CONCLUSION
Although tax preferences for capital gains may add to the complexity
of the tax law, the contribution of tax preferences to economic growth
more than counters any negative consequences. Capital gains prefer-
ences encourage investors to realize capital gains and to reinvest the pro-
ceeds in growth-oriented entrepreneurial ventures, thereby stimulating
employment opportunities. 95
Excessive capital gains taxation hinders economic growth by restrict-
ing the flow of venture capital to its most efficient use.9 6 Tax reforms
should not blindly strive to simplify complex capital gains provisions
without considering the economic impact on savings, investment, and
employment opportunities. The Ninety-ninth Congress should grant tax-
payers the option to deduct an increased percentage of capital gains or to
index capital gains for inflation. Only by enhancing the preference for
capital gains may Congress "unleash the tremendous pent-up power of
88. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
89. Capital gains provisions are progressive; only those individuals in the highest income
bracket are taxed at the maximum rate. See supra note 20. Moreover, wealthy taxpayers realize a
large percentage of long-term capital gains. See supra note 85. But see Blum, supra note 1, at 261-62
(the capital gains preference undercuts the redistributive effect of a progressive income tax-Argu-
ment 2).
90. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
91, See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
92. See Bartlett, supra note 85, at 6-7 (citing ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 322
(1984)).
93. Feldstein, Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 51, at 117-19.
94. See supra notes 24-38 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
96. Id,
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our economy" and "make America the investment capital of the
world.""
J. David Hershberger
97. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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Appendix A
The following chart summarizes the key elements of capital gains taxa-
tion under the existing tax system, the Treasury Department's recom-
mendation, and the five congressional tax reform bills.
Tax Proposal
Current Internal
Revenue Code
Treasury I
Treasury IIE
Bradley-Gephardt
Kemp-Kasten
Roth-Moore
Nickles-Siljander
DeConcini-Shelby
Maximum Ordinary
Income Tax Rate
Exclusion
Individuals Corporations Ratio
60%A
0%
50%
0%
40%A
0%
60%A
9%
Maximum Effective
Capital Gains Rate
Individuals Corporations
20%
35% B
17.5% c
30%
17%c
34%
6%
19%
28%
33%B
28%B
30%
20%D
36%
28%
19%
A Applies only to long-term capital gains; maintains the distinction between long- and short-
term capital gains.
B Capital gains to be indexed to inflation and taxed as ordinary income.
C Taxpayer may elect (1) to have all capital gains indexed to inflation and taxed as ordinary
income or (2) to exclude 50% of the capital gain and subject the remaining 50% to ordinary tax
rates.
D Corporate taxpayers may elect (1) to apply a separate 20% tax rate to capital gains or (2) to
index capital gains to inflation.
E Rates not applicable until 1991, when the proposal would be fully implemented.
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